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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MAXFIELD C. WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Case No.

10064

ANNA SHAW WHITEHEAD,
Defendant-Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACT
It is necessary for defendant to set forth an
additional statement of facts as the plaintiff's statement does not set forth the facts as the trial court
found them and upon which the trial court based
its decision.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence Exhibit
P-1 contending that it was a financial statement
of his assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1957.
The plaintiff thereafter introduced in evidence Exhibit 2-P, which he contended shows the assets and
liabilities of the plaintiff as of December 31, 1961.
Fron1 reading the record and from the findings of
fact and conclusions of law as found by the trial
1
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court, Exhibit P-2 introduced by the plaintiff was
totally unreliable and found not to reflect the plaintiff's true net worth (see R-56, 57, 58) and further
did not contain a complete statement of the plaintiff's assets. R-57. In this regard it was defendant's
contention at the trial, and the trial court found
that the plaintiff was purposely attempting to
conceal his assets in order to create the impression
that during the marriage of the parties the plaintiff's net asset position had decreased, whereas in
truth and fact he had actually increased his net
worth during the marri:age. See R-56, 57, 58. This
is particularly borne out by the testimony of the
plaintiff on cross examination, wherein he was
forced to admit that he had, prior to the trial,
violated the order of the court, and had di'Sposed of
property which the court had restrained him from
selling. See R-121, 122, 1123. Further, the plaintiff
refused to disclose at the time of trial, by evasive
.answers, the amount of King Oil Company stock
he possessed. It was only after the trial court admonished the plaintiff that the plaintiff, subsequent
to the trial, furnished the court with a record of
the King Oil Company stock purchased during the
marriage. Said stock, plaintiff contended, was held
in the name of his children. See R-125, al'So letter
of plaintiff's counsel dated February 5, 1963, R119, 120.
The parties were married on the 27th of December, 1957, and sepa:r.ated on or about the latter
part of April, 19'62.
2
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The defendant introduced in evidence Exhibit
·l-D, which is a financial statement of the plaintiff
prepared by the plaintiff and his attorney showing
the assets and liabilities ~as of October 1, 1'960, and
which shows the plaintiff as having a net worth of
$125,950 exclusive of the 30,000 shares of King
Oil Company stock. Further, the testimony and evidence shows that during the period of the marri~ge
from 1957 to and including 1961 the defendant
wife was working 1as a school teacher and contributed to the marriage her earnings in the sum of
$23,082.78. During this same period of time, the
plaintiff husband showed earnings and losses as
follows: 1957-loss from business $3,136.31; earnings from rental property $506.57. 1958-earnings
$63.20 from Utah Power & Light Co.; $43.75 from
Don M. and Garn G. Christensen; $160.00 fron1
Maxco, Inc.; $638.00 from his contracting 'business;
and a loss of '$746.'68 from other sales of stocks
and property. 1959-earnings from b u s i n e s s
$1,7 48.43; loss from stock manipulations and other
sales $557.24. 1960-income from Utah Power &
Light Co. $3,868.92; miscellaneous earnings $685.85.
1961-earnings from Utah Power & Light Co.
$3,756.09; additional business income $5'93.82; a
loss of $1,398.28, or a net income of $2,951.64 for
the year 1961. See R..:57 and Exhibits 10, 11, 3-D
and 6-D.
During this same period of time the court
found from the testimony of the plaintiff that he
3
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paid a total of $5,645.65 as support money to his
former wife for .the support and maintenance of
his ,three minor children by a prior marriage. R-57.
During the period of the marriage the defendant bought the groceries and paid the utilities. R-89.
Further, the defendant made payments on the 1955
Mercury automobile of some $680.00 (R~90) and
also paid for some of the repairs on the 1955 Mercury. R-91. ·Further, the defendant planted the
shrubs and took care of the landscaping of the home.
R-'93. Further, the furniture which was purchased
by the plaintiff· prior to the marriage and which
was being paid for during the marriage was left
in plaintiff's possession even though payments. to
the extent·of $450.0.0 were made by defendant. See
R-117.
During the period of the marriage the plain.tiff was buying and selling. property, both real and
personal, and was delving in the stock market, and
was substantially free from any financial obligations of the marriage, and was able to handle his
property in about any manner he saw fit. R-81 to
85, R-119, 121, 12'2, 12'5. As was generally testified to by- the defendant during the time that plaintiff was free to engage ·in these activities she was
'paying the utili ties, buying the groceries, taking
care of any Cleaning expenses, care of the . plaintiff's dog, purchasing medicine, paying for the
shrubs and landscaping, the plaintiff's pers:::>nal expenses, the car .insurance, some gas and car main4
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tennnce, general household expenses, repair of washer, television, purchase of newspaper, and even
carrying the plaintiff on the defendant's hospital
and surgical insurance. See R-145, 149, 162, 54-58.
The only thing the defendant took from the
marriage was approximately $800.00 in savings
(R-1-!6) and the miscellaneous items of personal
property which she brought into the marriage, or
which were given to her as gifts, all as more particularly set forth on Exhibit 7-D, said Exhibit being
an itemization of the items which defendant was
permitted to take from the home at the time she
left. During the defendant's testimony, a dollar
value was placed upon those items which were accumulated during the marriage and which the defendant took with her, and the said dollar value is
set opposite the items in pencil figures on said Exhibit 7-D and which items total $104.10. The balance of the i terns were her personal property prior
to the marriage or given to her by her parents or
friends.

A:RGUMENT
POINT I .AND 1'1.
THE TRI.A:L COU'RT DJlD NOT ERR IN 'ENTERI~G ITS SUPPLEMENTAL 'FINDINGS OF FACT AND
IX DEN):ING PLAINTIFF~s MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL; AND FURTHER THE TRIAL COURT 'DID NOT
ERR I~ A\V ARDING DEFENDANT AS ALI,MONY
AXD PROPERTY SETTLEMENT THE SUM OF
$10,000.00.

Point I and Point II of plaintiff's brief will be
5
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argued together as they pertain to the same subject
matter.
It was and is the defendant's contention that
the plaintiff's Exhibit P-2, alleging the assets and
liabilities of the plaintiff as of December 31, 1961,
was wholly false and did not reflect a true statement of the plaintiff's net worth. The court found
that this was the case, and in paragraph 5 of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law the court so
stated that said financial statement did not reflect
a true statement of the ·plaintiff's net worth, and
further did not reflect the purchase of 30,000 shares
of King Oil Company stock purchased during the
marriage and which was an asset of the plaintiff.
R-57.
With reference to plaintiff's financial statement, Exhibit P-2, plaintiff has attempted by said
Exhibit to show that his assets are considerably
'below that which he possessed at the time of his
marriage to the defendant, to-wit, December 31,
1957. The court should compare this with the financial statement, Exhibit 4-D, which the plaintiff and
his attorney prepared, and which shows the plaintiff's financial condition as of October 1, 1960. According to the financial statement of October 1,
1960, Exhibit 4-D, the plaintiff shows a net worth
of $125,950.00 as compared with $111,759.37 which
he claimed as of December 31, 1957. Actually during this period of time the plain tiff was increasing
his assets while being supported by his ·wife, the de6
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fendant. Between October 1, 1960, and December
31, 1961, plaintiff attempts to show a loss in total
net worth in excess of $79,967.03. A slight perusal
of the plaintiff's income tax returns for 1960 and
1961 shows that these were two years in which
he made more money than he did in 19'57, 1958 and
1959. See Exhibits 4-D, 10, 11, 9, 3-D.
It is obvious that the plaintiff by his balance
sheet and financial statement of Decemlbe:t;" 31, 1961,
has attempted to ·place values upon his property
which would be consistent with the purpose for which
he has submitted his financial statement, .. to-wit,
to attempt to show that the defendant has bankrupt
him. However, it is very obvious that he has purposely on his 1961 financial statement set the values
as low as he thought he could reasonably justify
in .order to accomplish the purpose h~ in tended".
Compare the values of the real estate on plaintiff's
1961 financial statement with the values of the real
estate on plaintiff's 1960 financial statement, Exhibit 4-D. For example, the house and lot at '578
East 3610 South, plaintiff has listed the home at
a value of $15,800. The defendant testified that the
reasonable fair market value of said home was
$16,000 with a balance on a first mortgage of
$8,200, which would leave approximately $8,000
equity. Whereas, the plaintiff lists an equity
of S5,-19-1.26. Compare again item 4 on Exhibit
4-D, Schedule "B", wherein the plaintiff lists
six building lots at a v.alue of $1,600 each and com7
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pare the same with Schedule A-1 on the plaintiff's
Exhibit 2-P, where he lists five building lots in
Maxfield Subdivision at a value of $5,500 or $1,100
each. Somehow or other said lots suddenly lost $500
in value per lot. Compare again item 5 on Schedule
B of Exhibit 4-D, the Schedule A-1 of Exhibit 2-P,
the two building lots on LaDoor Drive. On the 1960
schedule plaintiff lists them a:t a value of $2,400
each. On plaintiff's 1961 schedule he lists them at
a value of $800.00 each. The plaintiff's purpose is
obvious in this particular.
During the period of the marriage the plaintiff paid to his former wife for the support and
maintenance of his former wife and minor children
by his former marriage the sum of $5,645.65. R.
104. It is obvious and the trial court so found that
the plaintiff, Mr. Whitehead, was supported and
maintained by his wife, the defendant, during the
period of his marriage, leaving the plain tiff free
to buy and sell real and personal property, stocks,
etc., as he saw fit; all this at the expense of being
supported by his wife. A glance at the income tax
returns of plaintiff and defendant, as shown by
the Federal tax returns, shows that Mr. Whitehead
had total net earnings during this period of
$8,85'5.87 while Mrs. Whitehead, the defendant, had
total net earn'ings during said period of $23,082.78.
After deducting the $5,645.65 that Mr. Whitehead
paid for support money to his former family, it is
obvious that if Mrs. Whitehead had not been sup8
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porting him and buying groceries and taking care
of their obligations, that said support money would
not have been paid.
On cross examination of the plaintiff, the defendant attempted to make the plain tiff answer
with respect to the King Oil Company stock. After
the court admonished the plaintiff, his attorney
agreed to produce a statement of the number of
shares of King Oil Company stock purchased by
the pbjn tiff during the marriage; and on February
5, 1963, nearly two weeks after the trial, a list of
said stock was subnii tted to the court and to counsel
for defendant. See ·the plaintiff's letter da:ted February 5, 1963, and the schedule attached thereto
showing ·28, 000 shares of King Oil Company stock.
Compare this with the 2,000 shares of King Oil
Company stock which the plaintiff lists on his financial statement, Exhibit 2-P.
The defendant submits that the plaintiff has
not come into this court in an honest attempt to
set forth the property of the parties, but rather
to attempt to mislead and confuse the court as to
the assets Which he possesses. 'The defendant at
R-13'7, 138, 139, sets forth a list of the property
which the defendant claims was accumulated during the marriage and in which she claims an interest. A quick comparison of values on the· various
balance sheets, Exhibits 2-P, 1-P and 4-D, shows a
,·alue in excess of $70,000. The $10,000 awarded
by the court to the defendant !s minor in comparison.
9
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( · ·:;Certainly-in view of the fact that th~·plaintiff
has not come forward with clean hands and presented an Honest financial sta,tement, the testimony
of the defendant should be accepted by the court as
undisputed. evidence of the accumulated marital
property. The plaintiff's attitude with respect to
the orders: .of the court was amply displayed when
he admitted without compunction that he sold 200
shares of Investment Resources contrary to the
order ,of the court ·restraining him from doing so
prior to the triaL .See R-121, 122, 123. However,
until the pl~in tiff was· confronted with the evidence
showing: ~aid. sale, ·to-wit, Exhibit 5-D, _the·plaintiff
could not seem to remember what had happened to
said· stock.·:· ,
The plaintiff in a magnaminoils gesture indicated that the :defendant could have the 1955 Mercury automobile, which had a fair market value of
$'150.00 and was not 'In useable condition because the
trahsmissiorl' was out of' order~
·Eyen though these parties wel·e only married in
December .1957, the- plaintiff cannot walk out of
this marriage witp all of. ~he benefits and accumulations without making some equitable adjustn1ent to
the defendant,. who has maintained 'and supported
hiin and the household during the period of their
marriage. The statutory _provision which is pertinent to this situation is Section 30-3-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as an1ended, which reads as follows:
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties and the maintenance of the parties and children as may be
equitable; • • *"
This Court has in a number of cases passed on
the question of division of property between the
parties. See Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72,
176 P 2d 144; Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67
P 2d 265; Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112_ -qtah 3'1,
184 P 2d 670; Willy v. Willy, 113. Utah 39~, 195 P
2d 743; Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84;
Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 166 P 2d 513.
The gist of all of these decisions is to the effect
that the trial court should consider all of the circumstances of the parties, the amount of property
owned by each of· them; whether said property was
accumulated· before the marriage or after the marriage; the ability and· opportunity of each to earn
money; the financial condition and necessity of each
party; the health of the parties; the standard of
living of the parties ; the duration of the· marria:ge ;
what the wife gave up by way of the marriage, and
what age they were when they were married.
·
I

All of these factors taken into consideration
resolve themselves to the point that the court in
effect should make a fair and equitable distribution considering what the wife has put into as well
as what the husband has brought into the marriage.
11
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In the case at bar where the defendant has in the
four years of the marriage worked and earned a
substantial income, all of which has been contributed
to the benefit of both parties; and whereas the plaintiff has used his own property for purposes of investment and reinvestment, and to gain a material
benefit from those investments, it would only appear proper and fair that the defendant wife should
be en ti tied to a fair share of those assets and particularly in a case such as this one where the plaintiff has attempted to misrepresent his assets to the
court.
The plaintiff has attempted in his testimony
to state that the defendant did entirely as she
pleased with her own income and made no accounting whatsoever to him or contributed anything to
the marriage by reason of her income, and in this
regard note should be taken of the plaintiff's testimony with respect to the long vacation periods
which the plaintiff contends the defendant engaged
in as compared to the testimony of the defendant,
wherein she stated her visitation consisted of four
or five days a year at the most in visiting her parents or her grandfather, .and on one occasion as
much perhaps as twelve or thirteen days. See R-148.
It is obvious the trial court did not believe the plaintiff's testimony in this regard. See R-57, par. 6.
The decision of the trial judge in this case
should be upheld unless the plaintiff can show a
clear abuse of discretion. In the case of Wilson 7'·
12
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H.ilson, G Utah 2d 79, page 84, 296 P 2d 977,
the court stated:
"It is true as defendant contends that a divorce proceeding is equitable and that it is
within the prerogative of this court to review
the evidence and to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court under proper circumstances. More recent pronouncements of
this court and a policy to which we adhere are
to the effect tha:t the trial judge has considerable latitude and discrimination in such matters, and that his judgment should not be
changed lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless
it were such a manifest injustice or inequity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion."

See also McDonald v. McDor~Jald, f20 Utah 573,
263 P 2d 1066; Lawlor v. Lawlor, 240 P 2d 271, 121
Utah 201.
In Point I of the plaintiff's argument, the plaintiff states the court was confused with respect to
the purchase of the King Oil Company stock. The
plaintiff in his letter of February 5th states that
the 28,000 shares of King Oil Company stock was
purchased in January, February, March and April.
Since the parties separated sometime in April, 1962,
the stock would be included as a part of the mari'tal
assets, even though it was purchased by funds from
the sale of other properties. Note, however, the
plaintiff's testimony at page 77 of the record wherein he states:

"Q. And how many shares do you have in
King Oil Company?
13
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A.

Q.

Approximately 8,000 that was listed on
the deposition that was taken, whatever
that is, and then there is some more in
the safe deposit box.
Now this in the safe deposit box, in whose
name is that stock?
1

A.
Q.
A.

It is in my name.
Has it been endorsed?
It is sealed up in an envelope addressed
to my children.

Q.

And when did you-

A.

Stamped envelope.

Q.

And when did you purchae that stock?

A.

About the same time, the first part of
this year, and the last part of last year,
and the first part of this year.

* * * *
Q.

That purchased in the early part of '62
or the latter part of '61 is that correct?
A. That is correct." (R-77-78)
The plaintiff's complaint about the trial court's
finding with respect to the 28,000 shares of the
King Oil Company stock as not being included in
the financial report of the plain tiff dated December 3'1, 196'1, is wholly unjustified. Reference to the
above testimony of the plain tiff should be noted in
this respect in which the plain tiff by his own testimony sets forth the stock as being purchased in 1961
and 1962. The fa.ct that the plaintiff misrepresented
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

thr facts and his refusal to disclose the facts certainly would justify the trial court finding against
the plaintiff in every particular possible wherein
the plaintiff has not made a complete disclosure
to the court. It should be noted that the letter of
February 5, 1963, was not submitted to the court
until sometime after the actual trial. Certainly the
plaintiff cannot complain if there were any error
with respect to the actual purchase date and whether
or not they were included in a particular financial
staten1ent of the plaintiff.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
Attorney for Respondent
304 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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